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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PRICE DISCRIMINATION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT 
WENDY J. GORDON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Under federal copyright law, Congress places some works of 
authorship in the public domain, and leaves some behaviors by the 
public unregulated. The same is true of patent law. Historically, 
courts have generally respected the resulting liberties. 
Imagine that a publisher of Shakespeare's sonnets puts a label on 
each volume saying, "By Taking Possession of This Volume The 
Purchaser Promises Not to Resell, Loan or Rent it, and Further 
Promises Not to Copy Or Publicly Recite The Poems Printed Herein." 
We expect that a state court would refuse to enforce the purported 
restriction.1 Similarly, the manufacturer of an unpatented device 
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1. Mid-century, when the Metropolitan Opera broadcast its performances of classic 
compositions, the risk of nonconsensual copying or rebroadcast was significant. Record 
companies that were licensed to make recordings or that themselves had hired performers 
lacked the limited rights now found in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(7), 106(1)-(3), 106(6), 114, 1101 
(1997). Performers and companies tried to use "do not copy" labels to give themselves rights 
that Congress had not awarded. Learned Hand famously rebuffed one such attempt in RCA 
Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940): 
Of the nine records here in question five ... bore the legend: 'Not Licensed for Radio 
Broadcast.'... After August 15, 1937, this notice was changed to read as follows: 
'Licensed by Mfr. under U.S. Pats. 1625705, 1637544, RE. 16588 (& other Pats. 
Pending) Only For Non-Commercial Use on Phonographs in Homes. Mfr. & Original 
Purchaser Have Agreed This Record Shall Not Be Resold Or Used For Any Other 
Purpose. See Detailed Notice on Envelope.' These later records were inclosed in 
envelopes which even more clearly gave notice of the same limitations .... 
. . . [E]ven if (the conductor's] 'common-law property' in his performances 
survived the sale of the records on which they were inscribed, it would be very difficult 
to see how he, or a fortiori the maker of the records, could impose valid restrictions 
upon their resale .... We do not, however, have that question to decide, for we think 
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cannot expect to gain any legal rights by painting "Do Not Copy" on 
each product as it rolls toward the end of the assembly line. Yet 
today courts are beginning to honor just such restraints in the context 
of contracts over computer software.2 
To justify enforcing these restrictive legends, the supposed 
virtues of "price discrimination" are sometimes offered. Indeed, 
Harold Demsetz has shown that in some circumstances price discrimi-
nation might make possible what is usually thought impossible: 
simultaneously providing incentives to authors and inventors, and 
access to everyone who values the product above its marginal cost.3 
But at no point does Professor Demsetz or anyone else suggest that a 
monopoly coupled with price discrimination will always produce 
results superior to those achieved in a competitive market. 
Price discrimination increases a producer's revenues, and thus 
that the 'common-law property' in these performances ended with the sale of the 
records and that the restriction did not save it; and that if it did, the records themselves 
could not be clogged with a servitude. 
Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added). 
I do not mean to overstate the state courts' unanimity. Some attempts to enforce restraints 
on chattels have been successful. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 
HARV. L. REV. 945, 957-69 (1928); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round: 
Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1262 (1956) (arguing, largely without 
reference to copyright, that "enforcement [of equitable servitudes on chattels] ought to depend 
on public policy"). In addition, much of what the plaintiff attempted in Whiteman was later 
achieved under the misappropriation doctrine. See Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950)1 affd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1951). 
For an exploration of the equitable servitude doctrine in the computer context, see 
Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of 
Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENY. U. L. REV. 577 (1994). 
2. It might be argued, however, that a true servitude would "run with" the object, no 
matter how the object finds its way into someone's hands, while today's shrinkwrap and click-
through licenses generally purport only to restrict the purchaser and those with whom he trades. 
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996). In current commentary, a 
live question is when (and whether) there can be such frequent coupling of copies with 
restraints that the practice should be treated as property. It is probably uncontroverted that 
equitable servitudes are property. See Chafee, Equitable Servitudes, supra note 1, at 957-69. 
3. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 
(1970). Copyright and patent give a degree of market power, sometimes a monopoly. All 
acknowledge that the monopolies that the law produces to provide incentives involve a 
deadweight allocative loss. Professor Demsetz argues this loss could in theory be eliminated by 
perfect price discrimination. Under perfect price discrimination, every customer would pay an 
amount exactly equal to the maximum he or she would be willing to pay. Consumer surplus 
would be zero-but everyone who valued an embodiment at a level at or equal to its marginal 
cost would be able to possess one. The person who values a copy at marginal cost pays that 
amount, and everyone who values copies at higher amounts will pay more. No one would be 
excluded from access to the good. And because all the consumer surplus is transferred to the 
owner of the copyright or patent, incentives are at least as strong (actually, stronger) than they 
would be under conditions of a one-price monopoly. 
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potentially increases incentives.4 But it can also raise price and 
reduce quantities, without yielding any incentive payoff large enough 
to compensate. Yet the tool of price discrimination has recently been 
employed as if it were self-justifying. 
The error can be most easily seen if we recognize that all 
intellectual property law operates by fostering price discrimination. 
For example, when a copyright proprietor puts copies of her book, 
song, software, or movie on the market, copyright helps her to 
distinguish between copiers and non-copiers. It also helps her to 
charge differing prices among those purchasers who are public 
performers, adapters, public displayers, and so on,5 and to further 
subdivide the rights6 and pricing structures7 within those groups. 
Parts 18 and 119 of this essay explain the dynamics and the 
definitional issues involved. Part 11110 examines the well-known 
ProCD opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook,11 and critiques his 
handling of both the economic issues and the issue of pre-emption. 
Part IV criticizes the handling of price discrimination notions found in 
an essay within the current symposium.12 In that part I suggest that 
even where some price discrimination is necessary for incentives, 
more price discrimination is not necessarily better.13 
4. The increase in incentives is "potential" rather than inevitable, because at some point 
incentives will be adequate to call forth the desired work, and any further increase in revenues 
will be pure rent. 
5. The rights of authors (and their employers and assignees) are set out in various parts of 
title 17 of the United States Code. The major components appear in 17 U.S.C. § 106, set out 
infra in text accompanying note 24. Interestingly, the copyright statute is explicit about 
encouraging many more forms of price discrimination than appear in the patent statute. 
Compare infra note 23 (Patent statute) with infra text accompanying note 24 (Copyright 
statute). 
6. The extent to which intellectual property rights should be divisible has been a matter of 
debate. The 1976 Copyright Act 
contained[ ed] the first explicit statutory recognition of the principle of divisibility of 
copyright in our law. This provision [now enacted in§ 201(d)], which ha[d] long been 
sought by authors and their representatives, ... means that any of the exclusive rights 
that go to make up a copyright ... can be transferred and owned separately. 
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 
123 (1976). 
7. This can occur through a collective rights society such as ASCAP as well as through an 
individual employing the statute, as Jane Ginsburg has reminded me. Thus ASCAP can charge 
nightclubs a lower fee for playing its members' songs than it charges radio broadcasters. 
8. See infra pp. 1370-75. 
9. See infra pp. 1375-78. 
10. See infra pp. 1378-86. 
11. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
12. Part IV appears infra pp. 1386-89. The essay it examines is William W. Fisher III, 
Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998). 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80. 
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I. CLASSIC STORY RETOLD IN THE LANGUAGE OF PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION 
Intellectual property's traditional Genesis tale is essentially one 
of enabling a creator to price discriminate. A creator, whether 
inventor or author, wants to sell embodiments of her product.14 Some 
potential customers want to purchase her machine, story or database 
for their businesses; some want a copy for personal use such as 
recreation or looking up the phone numbers of old friends; and some 
want a copy for the purpose of reproducing it. 
Without an ability to distinguish at least two groups of 
customers-dividing the (1) end-users or consumers from the (2) 
publishers and other replicators- the creator will probably have to 
sell her embodiments at one price. Of the options this would leave 
open to the creator, none are happy, unless she is lucky enough to 
have a customer who values using the product at a price equal to its 
creation costs. In the absence of that rare circumstance, the creator 
has a few uncomfortable choices. She might aim at the consumer 
market, and ask a fairly low price for each embodiment. At this price 
(let's call it "P"), some consumers will be willing to buy the machines 
or books the creator sells. But replicators will buy as well. The 
creator may find her market drying up as consumers turn to buying 
the copies that replicators offer for sale at lower price. This lower 
price, which we might call "P-marginal," will tend to equal the 
marginal cost of making a new physical embodiment. 
The replicator is able to charge P-marginal and still stay in 
business because he does not bear the expenses of creation such as 
research and development.15 If copyists are able to sell identical 
embodiments (and this is a big "if" -the caveats are well canvassed in 
the copyright literature16) and charge only P-marginal for each, the 
14. A typical embodiment for inventors might be a machine or a chemical compound, and 
for authors a typical embodiment would be a book, cassette, or CD-ROM. Under copyright 
law, by definition, all embodiments can be classified as either "copies" or "phonorecords." See 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1997) (definitions of "copies, "phonorecords," and "fixed"). 
15. In addition, a copyist bears less risk than the creator did. A creator will not know in 
advance if her product is likely to be successful in the market. She therefore will create only if 
the revenue stream likely to result from success is large enough to cover her costs multiplied by 
a factor reflecting the odds of failure. A replicator can act after the creator's product has 
proven its market appeal. Because the replicator can be free of both creation costs and risk, the 
replicator will be willing to enter the market even if the projected revenue stream is smaller 
than the amount needed to motivate the creator. Note, however, to the extent that a replicator 
seeks to minimize risk through delayed entry, the creator's "lead time advantage" will be 
greater, and her need for IPRs less. 
16. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); 
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creator's embodiments priced above P-marginal, at P, are likely to go 
largely unsold. Creation costs will not be covered. 
Alternatively, the creator can lower her own price to P-marginal, 
and sell more embodiments. However, she will again be unable to 
cover her creation costs since (by definition) P-marginal does not 
include such costs. This option, like the option of charging P, will not 
encourage creativity. 
As another choice, the creator could aim at the "replicator" 
market, and demand a price for access to her manuscript or invention 
high enough to cover the costs of creation (adjusted upward for the 
creator's ab ante risks of failure). Let us call that price "P-prime." 
Unfortunately, any replicator will face the same problem as 
would have been faced by the creator herself, namely, competition 
from customers who themselves will copy. Therefore no replicator or 
group of replicators is likely to emerge that is willing to pay a price P-
prime.17 If that happens, creativity again will have insufficient 
incen tives.18 
Enter Intellectual Property Rights ("IPRs"). Patent law permits 
a potential inventor to distinguish between someone who wants to use 
her widget-making machine to make widgets, and someone who 
wants to use the machine as a prototype for manufacturing identical 
widget-making equipment. Similarly, copyright enables a potential 
novelist or songwriter to effectually distinguish between readers or 
listeners on the one hand, and publishers or record companies on the 
other. That is because any person who buys a copy of a book or song 
or machine has a legal duty to refrain from copying it without the 
creator's permission.19 Someone who wishes to replicate the product 
Wendy J. Gordon & Robert Bone, The Economics of Copyright, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (Edward Elgar & The University of Ghent, forthcoming 1999); Wendy J. 
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Tom G. Palmer, 
Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 
261 (1989). 
17. The caveats are well-known here, as well. For example, there might be an initial class 
of customers willing to pay P-prime because their internal valuations are high, independent of 
any possible revenue from copying. 
18. The world where there are no IPRs should not be confused with a world where there 
are some IPRs which provide Jess than perfect price discrinlination. The latter is the situation of 
the companies that own movie copyrights today, as discussed infra in text accompanying notes 
26-32. 
19. In addition, patent law forbids even independent replication. That feature of patent 
Jaw is usually explained by the frequency with which different groups racing to solve the same 
scientific problem may reach the same conclusion independently. It is argued that a "winner-
take-all" reward (given to the first inventor to succeed) is necessary if potential innovators are 
to have sufficient incentives to enter the race ab ante. Examining this logic would take us 
outside the scope of the instant paper. 
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must identify himself and negotiate a separate deal with the creator 
or face liability and, potentially, criminal sanctions.20 
Since the users who place a higher value on access to an 
embodiment will often be the users who plan to copy and resell it, the 
law's restraint on replication provides creators a means by which to 
divide most of the customers with high valuations from most of the 
customers whose valuations are low. The creator (or her employer or 
her assigns) can then charge different prices to each group. Further, 
since the law forbids copying regardless of where an embodiment was 
purchased, a replicator will gain nothing by purchasing a cheap copy 
from a consumer, or by pretending to be a consumer and purchasing a 
cheap consumer copy. Thus IPRs discourage arbitrage between high-
and low-valuation markets.21 
Under today's copyright practice, a free-lance author typically 
sells a copy of her manuscript and an exclusive right to reproduce it22 
to a single publisher for P-prime (say, an advance of $100,000). The 
publisher then resells copies to the members of the public at P (say, 
$20 per book). In the patent field, many inventors are employees 
who immediately assign their patents to their employing firm. The 
inventors receive a salary. The employing firms typically either sell 
embodiments of the invention to the public at P, or license another 
firm or finite group of firms to produce the invention for a fee of P-
prime. 
In neither the case of freelancers nor in the case of employee 
creators will copies be sold at P-marginal (the cost of physically 
making an additional embodiment), until the term of the copyright or 
patent has expired. It is hoped that by that time, a socially desirable 
work will have brought the creator (or her employer or assigns) more 
· than P-prime. 
The intellectual property law thus provides incentives by giving 
potential creators or their employers the prospect of covering 
creation costs by means of price discrimination. The price discrimina-
tion so provided is, by design, not perfect. This is perhaps easiest to 
20. For further development, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual 
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 211-66 (1992) and Wendy J. 
Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 
449, 472-77 (1992). 
21. The profit earned by a buyer who resells to a higher-valuation purchaser is known as 
"arbitrage." Where arbitrage is easy, price discrimination is difficult. 
22. Publishing contracts typically focus on the author's assignment of exclusive rights 
rather than on sale of a copy. Such contracts do not have to specify that a manuscript copy is 
being provided; that is understood, since the copyright is useless without a copy to work from. 
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see in copyright law.23 The primary grant of rights in U.S. copyright 
law appears in section 106. It provides that, "[s]ubject to" various 
exceptions, 
(T]he owner of copyright ... has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work 
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; 
and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.24 
Note that the statute gives copyright owners no right to control 
private performances (such as singing in the shower or playing a 
videocassette on one's living-room VCR). Further, the rights are 
subject to various exceptions, including the liberty that the First Sale 
Doctrine gives purchasers of lawfully-made copies and phonorecords 
to resell or rent the embodiments they have bought.25 
Note also that IPRs do not need to provide perfect price discrimi-
nation in order to perform their primary economic function: enabling 
a creator (or her employer or assigns) to sell embodiments at a price 
above their marginal cost. This can be seen by considering the 
situation of movie copyrights. 
American copyright law gives the owners of motion picture 
copyrights no legal rights by which to distinguish between end-users 
23. Patent law gives patentees control over the "making, using, offering for sale, or selling 
the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States." 
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(l) (1997). "(I]f the invention is a process," then the rights granted are 
slightly different: "the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling ... or 
importing ... products made by that process." Id. 
24. 17 u.s.c. § 106 (1997). 
25. The "First Sale Doctrine" gets its name from the way that it exhausts the copyright 
owner's right to control the distribution of a particular copy or phonorecord, under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(3), with the first sale of that embodiment. The Doctrine is recognized in 17 U .S.C. 
§ 109(a) (1997). 
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(who buy movie cassettes to see at home) and video rental shops. 
This is because the First Sale Doctrine limits a copyright owner's right 
to control distribution of copies.26 A difficult choice results for the 
movies' copyright owners. Selling cassettes at a low price aimed at 
consumers will mean the copyright proprietors will forego the high 
prices that video rental stores would have paid. Selling cassettes at a 
high price will mean foregoing most sales to consumers. 
Nevertheless, the business of making movies and selling movie 
cassettes continues.27 
One reason for the apparent continued viability of the market for 
movies and movie cassettes is the law's prohibition against copying 
and public performance. These prohibitions are too coarse-grained to 
themselves enable movie makers to charge a rental store more for 
cassettes than they would charge a consumer,28 but they do make 
other revenues available to the copyright proprietors.29 In addition, 
and most tellingly, the prohibition on copying makes possible selling 
to the video stores at a price above marginal cost. 
Video stores are willing to pay more than P-marginal because, 
unlike the replicators in the "no IPR" world, a video rental store that 
purchases copies from copyright proprietors at price P will face 
competition only from shops that bear roughly the same costs that the 
store itself does. Shops that rent or sell pirate copies to the public will 
presumably be sued30 before their super-low fees ruin the stores that 
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), discussed supra at note 25. In addition, since a copyright 
owner"s right to control performance is limited to "public" performance, he cannot charge a fee 
each time a privately owned cassette is played in a living room. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6). 
27. By using this example, I do not mean to indicate that the optimal number of movies is 
being made or that the optimal number of copies is being distributed. It may be that more (or 
fewer) movies should be made and sold. That is an issue to be separately determined. My point 
is that such issues of incentives must be determined before we know how much price discrimina-
tion, and how many tools for achieving market dominance, are necessary. 
Apparently, when it came to software and music, Congress was persuaded that the First 
Sale Doctrine did need to be amended in order to provide incentives. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) 
(certain commercial renting of records and software placed in the control of copyright owners). 
28. Another reason for the apparent viability of the cassette market may be the availability 
of price discrimination methods that do not depend on law, such as temporal discrimination: 
pricing a cassette high in the first few weeks (given that video stores often profit from 
trumpeting quick availability), and pricing it lower after time passes (when most video stores 
may already have bought their copies). 
29. For example, movie theaters and television broadcasters will pay for the right to 
"publicly perform" the film and to have copies of it. Therefore, cassette sales to rental stores 
and the public need not be as high as they would need to be if they were a movie maker's only 
revenue source. 
30. The First Sale Doctrine applies only to copies that are "lawfully made." See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109(a). As to pirate copies, the copyright owner has a right to control their distribution, 
including resale and rental. 
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purchase copies through legitimate channels. 
In sum, what intellectual property does is provide the writer or 
inventor a tool with which to distinguish classes of buyers. She 
cannot perfectly divide all buyers by the intensity of their valuations,31 
but she does possess a legal device for provoking self-selection by 
customers who plan certain typical, commercially-significant uses that 
involve differing intensities. Patent and copyright force such 
purchasers to identify themselves and bargain separately from 
ordinary purchasers, or face legal penalties for carrying out their 
plans without permission.32 
Not every intellectual product is covered by an IPR. Whether 
the public gains or loses by such lacunae is a matter for factual 
investigation. For example, consider databases. 
Many databases lie outside federal copyright. Some argue this is 
undesirable since databases can be expensive to create and cheap to 
copy. On the other hand, databases are an unusual product. Unlike 
the typical literary work, a database is something that an individual 
user or small group of users might value at a price close to P-prime. If 
so, it is possible that in her initial sale a database creator could recoup 
her costs and compensation for her risk.33 From the public's 
perspective, such a creator does not need to price discriminate.34 (Of 
course, from the creator's perspective, the more revenue the better-
and price discrimination produces more revenue.) 
II. WHAT'S IN A NAME? 
It might be asked why this matters. The answer is that the 
concept of "price discrimination" is currently popular, as both a tool 
and a solution, among courts and commentators. When faced with 
apparent shortfalls in traditional IPR protection, such as the refusal 
of copyright to protect many databases, an increasingly common 
31. Note that a recent article points out that intellectual property owners might not need to 
divide buyers by the intensity of their valuations in order to effectively price discriminate. See 
Yannis Bakos et al., Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117 (1999). 
32. To avoid liability, potential replicators declare their identity, self-selecting in what 
resembles a classic form of second-degree price discrimination. See LOUIS PHLIPS, THE 
ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION (1983). 
33. Game theory, studies of industry practice, and other theoretical and empirical aids 
would help us to determine whether or not the end-users who have a high individual value for 
the database would indeed pay a high price. There are obvious incentives for an individual 
potential purchaser to hold out and later copy from those entities that did purchase an initial 
copy. 
34. In this defined situation, she will produce her database even without the ability to 
control copying or disposition after the first sale. 
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response is "to foster price discrimination." 
Many lawyers feel more comfortable with the use of price dis-
crimination terminology in the contract than they will be with the 
notion that intellectual property law itself provides incentives by 
fostering price discrimination. Our lawyerly discomfort stems from 
our habit of seeing the individual rights granted by an intellectual 
property statute as separate "products" to be separately sold or 
licensed. We usually see the "right to reproduce" and the "right to 
make a derivative work" from a movie script as separate from the 
"right to read" it. And each of these in turn can be seen as separate 
from the "right to perform the script publicly." From that conceptual 
perspective, it is not "price discrimination" to charge one price, P, for 
the right to read a movie script, and another price P-prime, for the 
right to reproduce the script or adapt it for the screen, because the 
right to read and the right to reproduce or adapt are all seen as 
different commodities.35 But that habit of seeing separate products is 
a straightforward matter of conceptual choice. 
Alternatively, we can see that in both situations an identical 
object-a copy of the script-is being sold, and that the rights 
function to enable a copyright owner to distinguish between different 
intensities of script-buyer preference. Once the script is written, the 
cost of making a photocopy for a movie studio is the same as the cost 
of making a photocopy for a drama student, even though each 
purchaser wishes to exercise different liberties in regard to the 
script.36 
To see each right as a separate product is a form of "reification": 
seeing concepts as things.37 One purpose of economics is to help us 
see through forms of words to their actual functioning. But 
sometimes economics can be used to substitute for one misleading 
form of words another equally opaque. As will be discussed below, in 
ProCD and since, "price discrimination" is a potentially misleading 
form of words having an undeserved vogue. 
A definitional problem of a more formal nature should also be 
noted. "Price discrimination" refers to charging different buyers 
35. I am indebted to Jack Balkin here. 
36. The studio may want a liberty to make the script into a movie, and that right must be 
purchased. The student may want a liberty to read the script for homework. For this no explicit 
license need be purchased. 
37. The literature on reification is immense. Here I use the word in its simplest sense. 
"Res" is Latin for "thing," and to "reify" a concept is to treat it as if it existed as a thing 
neutrally appearing in the world rather than as an intellectual construct. 
1998] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PRICE DISCRIMINATION 1377 
different net prices for the same quantity of the same commodity. An 
invention or writing sold to a consumer (end user) can be seen as 
"one copy" of the product. A product sold to a commercial copyist 
can be conceptualized as "many copies" since it is in fact likely to 
result in many copies being made. It can be argued that copyright 
and patent are not forms of price discrimination, because they merely 
allow a writer or inventor to charge more for more embodiments. 
However, in all cases the customer is the purchaser of a single 
copy of the information. The information simply happens to be an 
input capable of generating copies of itself. As such, it is only one of 
many kinds of products that are capable of being used both for an end 
use and an input use. (That is, information is one of many products 
capable of being used both as a consumption good and a capital 
good). Consider seed corn. Someone who sells corn to purchasers 
who want to eat it may also sell corn to purchasers who want to plant 
it. The latter purchaser is using the corn to generate copies of itself. 
Nevertheless, should the seller endeavor to charge different prices to 
the two groups of purchasers, his efforts would be characterized as 
price discrimination.3s 
The issue is utility and consistency of definitions.39 Just as easily 
38. For the formulation in this paragraph, I am indebted to Michael Meurer. 
39. I am indebted to Ted Sims for identifying the quantity issue. 
Another definitional issue should be mentioned as well. Price discrimination occurs where 
"two varieties of a commodity are sold (by the same seller) to two buyers at different net prices, 
the net price being the price (paid by the buyer) corrected for the cost associated with the 
product differentiation." PHLIPS, supra note 32, at 6 (emphasis in original). By a "cost 
associated with the product differentiation," Phlips has in mind items such as transportation to 
the consumer. See id. at 6-7. 
An item priced at $600 when for sale at a market that the seller reached by spending $100 
on transport has a "net price" of $500. This is the same "net price" as the identical item whose 
price tag is $700 but which is located at a market that the seller spent $200 in reaching. There is 
no price discrimination between those two items, despite the difference in price tags, because of 
the difference in cost. 
Phlips's analysis .thus directs us to identify what "costs" may be attached to different 
embodiments. In ProCD and similar cases, the issue becomes comparing the cost of producing 
an embodiment that can be used only by an ultimate consumer, and an embodiment that can be 
commercially replicated. If there are cost differences significant enough to account fully for the 
pricing differences, then there is no "price discrimination" (technically speaking). 
Ordinarily the costs in making a "commercial" version of a work and a "consumer" version 
of it would seem to fall far short of explaining the large difference in price seen in cases such as 
ProCD. (If this is not so, there is no price discrimination.) But even where the physical costs of 
production are the same for the two embodiments, there is one element that might be described 
as "cost" that will indeed differ. This is the "cost" of profits from future sales that will be lost. 
Attached to the sale of a copy to a "commercial" client is the risk that a significant loss in 
profits will occur if the client copies and sells the work to people who would otherwise be paying 
customers of the original manufacturer. Should profits from such lost sales be treated as "costs 
associated with the product differentiation" under Phlips's definition? 
Counting "lost profits" as costs would be a difficult standard to administer and is 
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as we can conceptualize one computer disk as equal to the many disks 
that can be made from it, we can conceptualize "quantity" as equal to 
intensity of use. It is a classic concern of price discriminators to 
distinguish among consumers whose valuation differs because they 
have differing intensities of use. Differing intensities therefore do 
not, in the antitrust literature or the other areas where "price discrim-
ination" is studied, mean that different products or different 
quantities are involved. 
Moreover, Judge Easterbrook, too, treats as "price discrimina-
tion" the ability to charge one price to parties likely to make one or 
no copies, and another price to parties likely to make many copies.40 
Since this essay addresses how the "price discrimination" concept is 
being employed by lawyers and judges, the fact that my usage is 
subject to the same quibble as Judge Easterbrook's is a virtue rather 
than a vice. 
Ill. PROCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG 
In contract's march to conquer copyright, ProCD41 constitutes a 
victory for contract so complete that it threatens copyright's very 
ability to mount a defense. In ProCD, Judge Frank Easterbrook had 
to evaluate the legality of a shrinkwrap42 license contract, and a term 
within the purported contract stating that purchasers of the CD-ROM 
at issue were forbidden to make commercial use of the database the 
disk contained.43 That database, an extensive but essentially 
contravened by ordinary economic usage. Not only are lost profits fairly speculative, but in 
addition they are remarkably dependent upon the law's specification of entitlements. If I have 
an "exclusive right" over all reproductions of my work, then I have a potential market of all 
copies, and any copies sold by a stranger are "lost sales" with regard to me. If my rights are less 
extensive, then so are my potential "lost sales." For these and related reasons, it is at least 
arguably proper to use the term "price discrimination" to describe pricing differences between 
two identical items, produced at the same physical cost, even if sending one of the items into the 
stream of commerce will cause a competitive harm to the seller in the form of "lost future 
profits" that sale of the other item will not cause. 
40. The contract terms at issue in ProCD can be seen as distinguishing between the price 
for one copy of the database (sold to the ordinary consumer) and many copies (sold to the 
commercial buyer). 
41. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
42. The "shrinkwrap" license gets its name from the fact that retail software packages 
are covered in plastic or cellophane "shrinkwrap," and some vendors, though not 
ProCD, have written licenses that become effective as soon as the customer tears the 
wrapping from the package. 
Id. at 1449. 
43. See id. at 1450. According to the opinion, plaintiff ProCD spent many millions of 
dollars to compile and update its data. See id. at 1449; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 
F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (discussing plaintiff's efforts), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 
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unoriginal set of telephone-book entries, was probably uncopyrighta-
ble.44 Copyright law, therefore, could not prevent a purchaser from 
making and selling innumerable copies of the database, or (as 
defendant Mr. Zeidenberg did) from posting his copy of the database 
on the Web and charging his own customers for access to it. 
Under the purported contract, by contrast, a purchaser of the 
disk could do none of these things. The question thus raised (though 
not in these words) was whether directories of names and numbers 
that federal copyright places in the public domain should constitute 
part of the commons free for all to use, or whether a publisher who 
has put such public-domain material on a CD-ROM disk should be 
able to employ state contract law to impose restraints on its re-use. 
As a good legal realist and member of the Chicago School, Judge 
Easterbrook evaluated not only the state of the written law, but also 
the question of whether the purported license term would work to the 
benefit of consumers generally.45 He found that it did.46 
Enforcement, Judge Easterbrook thought, would assist the distributor 
in being able to charge two prices for the same CD-ROM database-
one low price for ordinary consumers, and a much higher price for 
commercial users-and that as a result of this dual pricing structure, 
the price to the ordinary person could be kept low and the quantity of 
copies distributed could be increased.47 Easterbrook called this 
device "price discrimination,''48 and, obviously viewing price discrimi-
1996). The defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, bought a "consumer package" of the database, 
and made it "available ... to anyone willing to pay [his] price-which, needless to say, is less 
than ProCD charges its commercial customers." ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450. 
Since the consumer package contained a writing that purported to prohibit commercial 
use, see id., ProCD sued Zeidenberg for breach of contract. The District Court held that the 
breach of contract suit could not proceed because the shrinkwrap license was invalid and 
because federal copyright law pre-empted the contract's applicability. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. 
at 655, 659. Judge Easterbrook reversed, and directed the lower court to enter a judgment for 
the plaintiff. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455. 
44. Judge Easterbrook treats it as such, though, as he notes, the database may have had a 
more plausible claim to "originality" than did the white-pages phone book declared uncopy-
rightable in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See 
Easterbrook's opinion in ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. 
45. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449-50. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. at 1449-50, 1455. 
48. See id. at 1449. "Price Discrimination" is typically defined as a difference in price 
charged to different customers for the same commodity. See PHLIPS, supra note 32, at 5 (noting 
the traditional economic definition of price discrimination). 
The term price discrimination had a negative connotation in the past, being associated with 
various unsavory business practices, see NEIL M. SINGER, PUBLIC MICROECONOMICS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT FINANCE 85 (2d ed. 1976) (noting that usury laws, minimum-
wage laws, and truth-in-lending laws all arose as a popular response to the perceived evils of 
1380 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1367 
nation as a good thing in the context, upheld the license term against 
challenges brought both under state law and under the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution. 
The Supremacy Clause challenge arose because if federal law is 
to be the "supreme law of the land," state law must give way when it 
enters onto territory which is exclusively federal, or when it threatens 
to interfere with federal law. Back in the far-off days when the 1976 
Copyright Act was adopted, no one imagined that contracts could 
accomplish what copyright accomplishes. Copyright is a rule 
applicable to everyone. Contracts are expensive to negotiate, 
individually-crafted arrangements between individual signatories. 
The legislative history thus reflects an assumption that contracts by 
their nature are incapable of usurping exclusive federal territory.49 
But as the digital era progresses, contract and content alike 
proliferate with the flick of a keyboard button. With the increased 
use of standardized terms in "shrinkwrap" and "click-through" 
formats, and new statutory prohibitions that penalize efforts to bypass 
the copyright proprietor's technical gateways,50 the contracts attached 
to copies of a given work are likely to be cheap, uniform, and nearly 
ubiquitous. Thus digital technology and its legal accompaniments 
begin to bridge the gap between federal copyright and state contract 
law.51 
price discrimination), and with the statutory prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1997) (forbidding price discrimination "where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to lessen competition" or to have other specified anti-competitive effects). 
Price discrimination increases the profits that flow to a monopolist. In recent years, however, 
policymakers and economists have increasingly explored the possible merits of price discrimina-
tion as a way to increase the quantity of goods produced by monopolists. Some scholars seem to 
have been downright seduced by its possibilities. 
49. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1476, at 132 (1976). 
50. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (1997). "No person shall circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected [by copyright] under this title." Id. 
§ 1201(a)(l)(A). Thus, if Database Proprietor Mr. X makes his uncopyrightable database 
available only in a format which also includes some copyrightable material (such as programs 
that enable the data to be manipulated, or a narrative description of the database's properties), 
the new statute would assist Mr. X. It would back up the technical devices he employs to keep 
people from accessing the database without having signed a contract. Admittedly, the statute 
makes some effort to protect the public's "ability to make noninfringing uses" of particular 
classes of works, see id. § 1201(a)(l)(B), but it is unclear whether that ability will in fact be 
safeguarded. Note, further, that the statute nowhere makes it unlawful to use encryption and 
other technical gates to "lock up" public domain material. 
All contracts require leverage. Being able to lock something up gives one the power to sell 
or rent the key, at a price and on conditions. 
51. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 108-13 (1997); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in 
Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587 (1997). These developments are leading me to 
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The pre-emption issues so raised by ProCD are complex.52 
Equally complex are the technical and normative issues of private law 
raised by the case.53 Of equal or greater difficulty are the welfare 
questions, in particular, the validity vel non of Judge Easterbrook's 
argument that because of price discrimination, social welfare would 
increase if the database at issue were made subject to the purported 
contract's restraints. 
Economists agree that price discrimination can increase social 
welfare under certain stringently defined conditions of monopoly.54 
That is because price discrimination can ameliorate the quantity 
restraints that a monopolist ordinarily employs to keep revenue high. 
But in ProCD it is not clear what pre-existing monopoly needed to be 
encouraged to expand its output. In fact, in Pro CD- and for 
databases generally- the issue is whether the producer should have a 
monopoly. 
The economists give us a predictable recipe for approaching that 
question: a monopoly in intellectual products (or any other system of 
copying restraint) is economically worthwhile if the benefits it 
produces outweigh its costs. To evaluate the benefits of such a 
monopoly, we would ideally try to discover what works would not 
appear without the incentive of the monopoly to lure them forth, and 
calculate their value.55 To evaluate the monopoly's costs, we would 
rethink portions of my own position on the gap between contract and copyright. See Wendy J. 
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1413-22 (1989). 
52. For example: Did Congress mean to put uncreative databases permanently in the 
public domain? Given the nature of the Copyright Clause, is Congress empowered (or on the 
other hand, is it mandated) to do so? What standard should be used to determine if a state is 
granting rights "equivalent to" copyrights, or whether state law is interfering with the 
achievement of federal goals? 
53. For example: Not only is the ProCD type of contract dictated by one side of the 
transaction and not seen at the time the consumer makes her purchase-thus raising concerns 
about autonomy- but the contract term also imposed a "restraint on alienation" of a form the 
common law has long disdained. 
54. See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright 
Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 896-98 (1997). Speaking generally, 
monopolists will produce at a rate that maximizes their revenue but which is sub-optimal from 
the perspective of social welfare because the monopolist's greatest profit comes (if he charges 
only one price) at a point where he is supplying less than competitive quantity. By price dis-
crimination (charging more than one price for the same commodity), the monopolist captures 
some of the consumers' surplus, and can increase revenue by increasing his quantity of 
production. This reduces the allocative shortfall that would have been created by the low level 
of quantity produced. The general dynamic is explained in Fisher, supra note 12, at 1236-39. 
55. See Stanley J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, in 8 
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 181 
(John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986). To this might be added any benefits from 
centralization, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265 (1977). 
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count up the value lost from factors such as (a) the restraints on 
access that the system imposes on works that would have been 
produced anyway;56 (b) works not produced or not disseminated 
because they needed to build on prior works in ways not permitted by 
the legal restraints;57 ( c) efforts or expenditures spent on "reinventing 
the wheel" that would not have been necessary if copying had been 
permitted;58 and ( d) the administrative costs of the system.59 
In sum, the key issue for a system of intellectual product 
regulation is whether the restraints it empowers brings forth enough 
works that would not have otherwise been produced to make the 
system's costs worthwhile. But although Judge Easterbrook 
examines some empirical data, the facts pull both ways,60 and at no 
point does the court make a finding that contractual restraints of this 
kind are in fact necessary to lure databases like this into being. Only 
if the restraints possessed such incentive power would we be in a 
realm where monopoly of any kind-and price discrimination as 
ameliorative-would be useful.61 
Consider, here, Judge Easterbrook's logic: 
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by 
charging a single price - that is, if it could not charge more to 
commercial users than to the general public-it would have to raise 
the price substantially over $150. The ensuing reduction in sales 
would harm consumers who value the information at, say, $200. 
They get consumer surplus of $50 under the current arrangement 
but would cease to buy if the price rose substantially. If ... the only 
way to make a profit turned out to be a price attractive to 
commercial users alone, then all consumers would lose out-and so 
56. This would include, for example, the welfare loss a prospective purchaser would 
experience if the artificially high price enabled by the monopoly precluded her purchase. See 
the discussion of "deadweight loss" in Fisher, supra note 12, at 1236, 1240. 
57. We might call this "free speech costs." For example, in cases where a parodist or critic 
is judged to have copied "too much" of the parodied work to avail himself of the Fair Use 
Doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997), the parody or critique is subject to injunction. 
58. Identifying this problem is usually credited to Bob Gorman. 
59. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). 
60. "The database ... cost more than $10 million to compile and is expensive to keep 
current" ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). Yet, as Judge 
Easterbrook notes, the database "is much more valuable to some users than to others. The 
combination of names, addresses, and SIC codes enables manufacturers to compile lists of 
potential customers. Manufacturers and retailers pay high prices to specialized information 
intermediaries for such mailing lists; ProCD offers a potentially cheaper alternative." Id. Judge 
Easterbrook did not explore the latter fact, but it means that that retailers and manufacturers 
might as customers pay enough in an initial sale of the database to more than cover creation 
costs. See supra note 17. 
61. For a useful investigation of price discrimination in the copyright context, see Meurer, 
supra note 54, at 849. 
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would the commercial clients, who would have to pay more for the 
listings because ProCD could not obtain any contribution toward 
costs from the consumer market.62 
1383 
But is the result so clear? If the commercial price were $500, say, and 
even one of ProCD's commercial customers reproduced the database 
for resale, that copyist would likely charge consumers something far 
less than ProCD's price. The consumer would no longer lose out, she 
would just buy a cheap copy from the replicator. 
I do not claim that this is a necessarily good result.63 My point is 
that these are difficult empirical questions of a kind Congress is best 
able to resolve. 
Recall that Judge Easterbrook's conclusion regarding the virtues 
of price discrimination was premised, as the opinion says, on ProCD 
being able to charge "a single price."64 But in a realm without legal or 
technological systems to control copying, ProCD could not easily 
control price at all- neither a single price nor a dual-price structure. 
That is because purchasers of ProCD's disks could reproduce and sell 
the database at prices different from, a!Jd presumably lower than, 
ProCD's. Just as an enforceable contractual restraint (or other form 
of restraint) makes price discrimination possible, it is just such 
restraints which are necessary if a seller is to charge "one price" 
which constitutes the only price in the market. 
In comparison with a monopolist charging a single price, a 
monopolist with a price-discrimination structure might be preferable. 
But in comparison with lawful free copying and a resulting range of 
62. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. 
63. For example, the existence of the copying might force ProCD to further raise its price 
to commercial customers, which in tum might lead to even commercial customers purchasing 
"unauthorized" copies, which in tum might drive ProCD into bankruptcy or discourage others 
from going into the business of database creation. In addition, Jane Ginsburg has suggested in 
conversation that the presence of high prices for commercial databases may mean that no copies 
at all get out to consumers. After all, how much would someone pay for a copy if his only 
interest was in selling copies of it? In a world without IPRs (or high-value initial customers or 
some other device to gain market power), once consumer copies were widely distributed, 
additional parties could soon enter the market and compete. This prospect of falling prices and 
profit could discourage anyone from going into the business of making and selling consumer 
copies. Therefore, Professor Ginsburg argues, the presence of high prices for commercial 
databases may mean that no copies at all get out to consumers. 
The point is a good one. But everything depends upon the particular facts. Imagine for 
example three retailers exist that can use the database to reach new customers, and that perhaps 
each of these companies values access to the database (for this nonreplicative purpose) at one-
third of ?-prime. If each paid one-third of P-prime for a copy, all three would have an economic 
motive (barring community, contextual, or legal restraints) to buy a "commercial" version of the 
database and open a sideline business as a seller of cheap copies or cheap Web access to the 
public. 
64. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. 
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prices, the advantages of price discrimination are (to say the least) 
hardly so clear. The opinion seems to assume that the choice is 
between a monopoly with no price discrimination -where the seller 
puts only one price on the database copies it sells-and a monopoly 
that contains some price discrimination. 
Perhaps Judge Easterbrook was assuming that the "commercial" 
copies of the database were subject to contractual restraints on 
copying that would escape pre-emption65 regardless of welfare effects. 
If these were the facts and the law, then a "commercial" buyer could 
not lawfully become a replicator.66 But to move logically from that 
complex set of assumptions (which was itself never stated) to a 
judgment that welfare would be increased by subjecting the 
"consumer" to a shrinkwrap copying restraint, the opinion would 
need to contain additional findings. 
Such findings are possible. For example, it might be 
economically desirable to enforce the shrinkwrap restraint on 
consumer purchasers like Zeidenberg if the total revenue available to 
ProCD from commercial customers was far beneath P-prime (leaving 
ProCD in need of significant revenues from the consumer market) 
and if the consumer market could only be effectively exploited if the 
law prevented the Zeidenbergs of the world from sharing the 
database commercially. Alternatively, even if one or more 
commercial customers paid P-prime to ProCD, it might be 
economically desirable to enforce a restraint on Zeidenberg if in the 
future commercial clients would purchase from Zeidenbergs rather 
than from database originators like ProCD.67 But Judge 
Easterbrook's opinion fails to address these points, and at least some 
literature suggests that commercial clients want format, accuracy, 
updating and debugging that a Zeidenberg's copy could not provide. 
In the wake of the 1991 Feist decision, where the Supreme Court 
first declared laborious compilations uncopyrightable if "unorigi-
65. This is far from an absurd assumption. Although the District Court opinion focused on 
the "consumer" version of the disks, that opinion could be read as indicating that even 
"commercial" versions carried with them a prohibition on copying. See ProCD, Inc. v 
Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996). Commercial buyers are more likely to 
negotiate real contracts than are consumers who buy off the shelf, and negotiated contracts are 
more likely to escape pre-emption than are shrinkwrap contracts. 
66. In such a case, the proper basis of comparison would indeed be "one high price" -
because no one who had a copy would be free to recopy it for consumers. 
67. That is, enforcing the constraints would be desirable if ProCD would be unwilling to 
distribute any copies to the consumer market in the absence of enforceable shrinkwrap 
constraints, and if none of ProCD's commercial clients made copies for consumers. 
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nal,"6s observers were often concerned about the ability of the 
database industry to continue. Yet many published reports suggest 
the industry experienced no significant difficulties in the wake of the 
Feist decision.69 Revenues kept flowing to the producers of even un-
copyrightable databases because purchasers wanted to obtain 
features that copyists could not provide: speedy and physically 
convenient modes of presentation, quick update services, guarantees 
of quality, or the like.70 
This suggests it is at least possible that ProCD would have kept a 
large portion of its customers even if commercial use and copying of 
the database were allowed- that is, ProCD may have produced the 
database even if it could not employ shrinkwrap licenses at all. 71 If 
this is the likely scenario, then the shrinkwrap license validated by 
ProCD merely imposed restraints on use, and consequently increases 
in price and decreases in the quantity of databases available. It made 
68. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
69. See, e.g., Presentation by David 0. Carson, Esq., 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 997, 1000 
(1992). Thus, though "copyright cannot be relied upon to prevent a competitor from lifting 
factual data from a database to use in preparing a competing product," in two days of 1998 
hearings "only one of fourteen witnesses described a situation in which he had suffered harm by 
the alleged extraction of information from his database." Database Antipiracy Legislation: 
Chronology, Status Report and Analysis (last modified Oct. 2, 1998) <http://www.aalp.org/ 
piracy.html>. 
I must admit, however, that some of the continuity in database revenues may have been 
due to the presumed availability of contract enforcement. See Carson, supra, at 1001; see also 
Paul T. Sheils & Robert Penchina, What's All the Fuss About Feist? The Sky is Not Falling on 
the Intellectual Property Rights of Online Database Proprietors, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 563, 
575-76 (1992). 
70. Thus, Steven Metalitz, Vice President and General Counsel of the Information 
Industry Association, noted: 
Within weeks after the [Feist] decision [put white pages into the public domain], 
information crossed my desk about a new CD-ROM product that consisted of scanning 
white pages onto CD-ROM. That product has proven successful and fills a market 
need. But at the same time the licensing agreement [by which a user agrees to pay the 
original producer for access], even for telephone directories, is essential if you want the 
best possible product. If you want the most up-to-date listings, you do not want to wait 
until the directory comes out, you want to license the tapes of updates immediately, 
and for a variety of other reasons, while you may be able to make a non-infringing 
product without a licensing agreement, you are, in most cases, going to make a better 
product with a licensing agreement. 
Presentation by Steven J. Metalitz, Esq., 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 775, 783 (1992) (for his 
institutional affiliation, see 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 763 n.*). To similar effect see, e.g., Alfred 
C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist· Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the 
Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343, 1369 (1991). The classic discussion of non-
copyright modes of collecting revenues for intangibles is Breyer, supra note 16. Also see 
Palmer, supra note 16. 
71. This assumes ProCD would have had enough revenue to justify its investment even if 
some outliers, like Mr. Zeidenberg, would buy a copy only to recopy it or sell cheap access to it 
on the Web. Recall that this is presented merely as a hypothesis; I have no more proof than 
Judge Easterbrook did on the issue of whether in fact the contract terms constituted a necessary 
incentive to initial production. 
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things worse, not better, for consumers. 
It is all a matter of what baseline one chooses for comparison. It 
is only when one begins from assuming that a "single price" can be 
charged that price discrimination looks like a good thing. But to 
charge a single price, a producer needs market power, at the extreme 
a monopoly. One should not give such market power in the name of 
fostering price discrimination. 
Let us return briefly to the issue of federal supremacy over state 
contract law. If what occurred in ProCD is defined as "price discrimi-
nation," then the same definition of "price discrimination" covers 
copyright's method of fostering incentives. That means that even if 
price discrimination is a Good Idea, it's a Congressional Good Idea. 
This perception might raise more pre-emption difficulties than 
Easterbrook was willing to face. For if federal copyright law is using 
the same device as the purported contract term, but is applying that 
device differently, it certainly raises the possibility that wholesale 
enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses terms of this type might interfere 
with congressional objectives. 
IV. PROFESSOR FISHER AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
In an article entitled Property and Contract on the Internet, 
William Fisher III argues that the law should "facilitate" creators' 
shifting away from reliance on IPRs and toward reliance on "a 
combination of contractual rights and technological protections."72 
The supposed virtues of price discrimination play a large role in his 
argument.73 Yet Professor Fisher compares (as Judge Easterbrook 
did) the effects of monopoly lacking price discrimination, on the one 
hand, with, on the other, monopoly coupled with price discrimina-
tion.74 He then argues, unsurprisingly, that the former imposes higher 
welfare costs than the latter. Unfortunately, the Fisher essay leaps 
from that conclusion to the recommendation that courts and 
legislatures should foster price discrimination by enforcing 
contractual restraints on copying. 
What Professor Fisher neglects is that an information producer is 
unlikely to have a monopoly to begin with unless the law imposes 
72. See Fisher, supra note 12, at 1203. Professor Fisher also argues that the law should 
simultaneously require that "such 'private' arrangements abide by restrictions designed to 
protect the public interest," id., such as a protection for fair use, id. at 1246-47, 1250-52. 
73. See id. at 1234-40, 1251-52 
74. See id. at 1234-40. 
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restraints on copying. And whether such a restraint should be 
enforced is precisely the question to be decided in the contract cases, 
and precisely the question that intellectual property law has 
historically been entrusted with deciding.75 
Instead of comparing two monopoly scenarios, Professor Fisher 
should be comparing monopoly with a mixture of monopoly and 
competition. If a comparison is made between, on the one hand, a 
situation where monopoly is coupled with price discrimination, and, 
on the other hand, a situation where there are many competing 
sellers, the latter price will be considerably lower than the price under 
price discrimination. Also, the quantity of embodiments produced 
75. For this reason (among others), I find surprising Professor Fisher's assumption that a 
court would find it difficult to hold contracts like that in ProCD pre-empted. See id. at 1254. 
Even more surprising is his apparent relative indifference to whether or not courts should 
enforce Internet distributors' efforts to restrain commercial copying and other activities beyond 
the period of copyright expiration. See id. at 1248-52. He views such efforts as "somehow 
offensive" and something that we should "plausib[ly)" prohibit but which he thinks cause "[n)o 
great harm." See id. at 1249-50. Accordingly, he seems to prefer other strategies over adopting 
outright prohibitions on contractual restraints that seek to operate beyond a copyright's term. 
See id. at 1251-52. 
Should the Internet come to dominate our society as the delivery source for musical and 
literary works, paper copies of classics could become hard or cumbersome to find. It seems 
inadvisable (to say the least) for state law to empower an Internet provider to decide when and 
under what terms an orchestra can perform Beethoven symphonies, or a publishing company 
can reprint Shakespeare's sonnets, or a Tom Stoppard can write a play that quotes liberally 
from Hamlet. 
James Molloy has argued in conversation that competition among Net providers will keep 
the fees that any provider charges for reproduction and performance quite low. But, abstract 
models of free competition aside, I doubt those fees would be zero. Today, anyone can go to a 
library, take home a volume of Shakespeare's plays, photocopy enough copies for her theater 
group, and perform any of the plays-for free or for a hefty admission charge-without 
violating anyone's rights or asking anyone's permission. That should not change. 
I suspect that Professor Fisher would not disagree with the general point I raise here. But 
as written, his current proposals would permit only "browsing" in libraries' computers, see id. at 
1251, and not copying. He seems to endorse contractual restraints without regard to whether 
material is in the public domain. True, he argues that certain activities should be privileged 
(such as educational and political uses, see id. at 1250), but even commercial uses of our 
common heritage can provide significant public benefit at fairly low cost to each of us 
individually. (Consider in this regard Kenneth Branagh's excellent film versions of 
Shakespeare's plays.) 
Moreover, it is hard to imagine how a regime of technological protections buttressed by 
contract could even distinguish between favored and nonfavored uses without significantly 
eroding privacy. Professor Fisher suggests that the law "allow creators to bury in their products 
devices that prevented serial copying, thus reducing the risk that the material, once made 
available without charge to privileged users, would become available for free to all users." Id. at 
1251. But a privileged user can simply retype the literary work, or turn on a tape recorder as he 
plays the delivered music loudly, in order to obtain a physically unrestricted copy which he can 
then resell to others. Therefore, deliverers of content are unlikely to be satisfied with devices to 
prevent serial copying. If contractual restraints were also available to them, the issue would 
then be how to distinguish between privileged and nonprivileged users without invading the 
privacy of both groups. Professor Fisher does note the importance of privacy issues, see id. at 
1248 n.111. 
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will be at least as great. Both from an allocative and distributional 
perspective, therefore, provided that incentives are otherwise 
accounted for, the competitive solution will be better than a price dis-
crimination scenario. 
Admittedly, if there is need for copying restraints in order to 
produce an increase in incentives, then it may be advisable to enforce 
such restraints. If so, it may be advisable to enforce the copying 
restraints in a way that permits many rather than few sub-markets for 
price discrimination purposes. But that will not necessarily be the 
case. 
The foregoing is a subtle point that needs restating: Even where 
empirical evidence suggests that some monopoly power76 is a good 
idea for the purpose of increasing incentives, it is not necessarily a 
good thing to increase the amount of control and thus the amount of 
price discrimination involved. Consider, in that connection, the 
movie cassette market mentioned above, or the instance of second-
hand books discussed by Professor Fisher.77 
Congress has decided that at least some monopoly power is a 
good thing for movies and novels.78 Nevertheless, it may be a good 
thing that the First Sale Doctrine denies movie companies and book 
publishers a legal right over resales and rentals. Under that Doctrine, 
the owner of copyright in a movie or novel who wishes to sell 
embodiments must compete with second-hand, library, and rental 
copies of the same embodiment. 
Competition from these other sources reduces the price the 
copyright owner can charge, and gives consumers a number of 
alternate choices at alternate prices. This is good for consumers -
provided that the other rights that the law does give to the copyright 
owner (such as the right to control reproduction) provide sufficient 
incentives for the desired amount of creation. 
In Professor Demsetz's classic piece on price discrimination, 
perfect price discrimination appeared desirable because its infinite 
divisibility generated the seller at least as much revenue as did a 
monopoly- and Demsetz was working from a framework that 
76. I should mention that in the intellectual property field, the word "monopoly" is 
typically used loosely, to indicate that a seller whose work is desired by the public is given some 
control over price. Only rarely will that amount to a complete monopoly. Thus, some readers 
will read only Stephen King's books when they're in the mood for quality horror fiction, but 
other readers will view a number of other writers' books as potential substitutes. 
77. See Fisher, supra note 12, at 1237. 
78. Unlike uncreative compilations of data that are unprotected by copyright, movies and 
novels are protected against a range of commercially significant uses by purchasers. 
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assumed that full monopoly revenue was required to provide 
adequate incentives.79 However, if in a particular context a lesser 
amount of revenue is acceptable from the incentive perspective, then 
it is better to give IPR owners rights with lacunae than to give them 
all-embracing rights, no matter how finely the owners are able to 
price discriminate. Other things being equal, consumers are better off 
if price differences result not from one supplier's efforts to 
discriminate, but rather from the presence of additional suppliers. 
This means that Professor Fisher's charts need to be redrawn. 
Under the First Sale Doctrine, there are many sources for books and 
cassettes, and many prices. Therefore, a single-seller, single-price 
model is not the appropriate starting point for comparison.80 Instead, 
once the copyright owner of movies and novels has begun to sell 
cassettes and books, the copyright owner becomes only one of many 
decentralized sources for those movies and cassettes. 
The result, again, may be lower price and greater quantity. 
Therefore, so long as incentives are not an issue-and that is an 
empirical matter not to be settled by abstract graphs-it is lesser price 
discrimination rather than more that may increase consumer welfare. 
There is much to learn from Professor Fisher's excellent article, 
as there is from Judge Easterbrook's wide-ranging scholarship and 
jurisprudence. But each makes an argument about price discrimina-
tion that is flawed. In ProCD, the argument depends on unproven 
and even unstated assumptions; in the Fisher piece, the argument 
depends on an inappropriate comparison. 
CONCLUSION 
The Patent Act gives the inventor or her assigns the exclusive 
right to "make, use, and sell" the invention. This means (among 
other things) that if someone wants to mass-produce the invention, 
she needs a license from the inventor. This will cost more than 
purchasing a single embodiment of the invention. Similarly, the 
Copyright Act provides separate exclusive rights over reproduction, 
sale, adaptation, public performance, and public display. This means 
that copyright owners can distinguish in the prices they charge so that 
persons who buy a copy to read it pay one price, while those who 
want to reproduce, adapt, or publicly perform or display it need to 
79. See Dernsetz, supra note 3. 
80. See Fisher, supra note 12, Figure 1 at 1235. 
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spend more. 
Price discrimination classically was a way for monopolists to 
profit by distinguishing among different buyers' differing willingness 
to pay.81 Yet a monopolist charging a single price imposes a higher 
deadweight loss on society than one who does not. That is because a 
monopolist who price discriminates makes more money, but also 
provides more products to more people, than a monopolist who does 
not. 
So yes, it is true that once one has a monopoly in an intellectual 
product, it can be a good thing for society if that monopolist can price 
discriminate.82 That is what Professor Demsetz taught,83 and that is 
precisely what our statutes do.84 Incentives are necessary, so 
Congress grants exclusive rights that can lead to monopolies, and the 
rights are subdivided in a way that makes price discrimination easy. 
But the choices of where to allow price discrimination are deliberate. 
Thus, the copyright statute fosters price discrimination between 
readers and replicators, but does not foster price discrimination 
between those who buy a copy for reading pleasure and those who 
buy a copy to mine it for ideas on which to base their own next 
production.85 One cannot leap to the assumption that where some 
monopoly is a good idea, more price discrimination is better. 
Moreover, and most fundamentally, price discrimination is at best a 
mode of ameliorating a monopoly's effects. It is not a reason to 
approve a firm's efforts to use contracts to acquire monopoly power 
over a market. 
81. This willingness, in turn, is often dependent on intensity of use. The Copyright and 
Patent Acts single out particular intense uses, and give the IPR holder the power to charge 
differentially among them. 
82. But note that even if the allocative welfare effects of perfectly price discriminating 
among the buyers of an intangible were good, such price discrimination also produces a 
potentially noxious distributive effect: the elimination of consumer surplus. Under monopoly, 
with or without price discrimination, producers are richer, and consumers poorer, than they 
would be in a purely competitive world. 
83. See Demsetz, supra note 3, and the discussion of Demsetz in supra note 3. For other 
limitations on Professor Demsetz's analysis, see Michael Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Dis-
crimination (working paper 1999). 
84. It is not clear that Professor Demsetz saw that the intellectual property statutes already 
facilitated price discrimination. 
85. Under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1997) and settled caselaw, copyright cannot be claimed in an 
idea. 
